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I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years is not long in the span of human history, which is now
estimated to be anywhere from 40,000 to 100,000 years old or more. It is
not even long in the history of human communications or even in the
history of electronic communications. Telephony is well over 100 years old
and last century's so-called "new" services such as wireless, cable, and
satellite services have already been around for far more than a single
decade. Yet, in reflecting upon the ten years that have elapsed since the
*Donna N. Lampert is a founding member of Lampert & O'Connor, P.C., www.l-olaw.com,
a Washington, D.C. law firm specializing in communications legal, business, and regulatory
issues. The Author would like to thank Jennifer Phurrough and Joanna Georgatsos for their
thoughtful assistance on this Essay.
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passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996' ("1996 Act"), it seems
almost an eternity. Whether we knew it or not (and, no question,
technological change as well as the rapid growth of the Internet were
contemplated in 1996), the fact remains that the communications world that
we are confronted with in 2006 looks vastly different than what was
contemplated in the 1996 legislation.
This commentary does not offer an exhaustive review of what we
knew and what we did not back then or a delineation of the litany of
unexpected consequences post-1996. Indeed, the focus here is not even as
broad as the scope of issues of the 1996 Act itself. For such an endeavor,
far more space and time would be required, especially to address the
intricate and important issues that still swirl around many areas such as the
future of the broadcast industry in the digital world, the proper role of the
FCC and/or Congress in addressing content and media, or the specifics of
convergence, a term that has been used far longer than the now outmoded
"information super highway." Instead, the goal in this commentary is far
more modest: to offer some perspective on how the 1996 Act impacted
wireline services and particularly competitive wireline services. Especially
as the possibility of a congressional rewrite of the 1996 Act looms, we will
be well served by bearing in mind the lessons of the past.

II. THE 1996 ACT: TRULY LANDMARK LEGISLATION
Despite its many critics (one wonders how an Act that passed almost
unanimously could suddenly find itself virtually orphaned), the 1996 Act
was a landmark statute that reflected congressional understanding of a new
communications landscape. Congress rightly understood that monopoly
was not the best form of service provision for American consumers in
terms of innovation, service quality, and pricing. Consequently, Congress
codified changes that it believed, implemented swiftly, would move us to a
competitive world. At the same time, however, there were blind spots
where past lessons were forgotten or where it was easier or more expedient
to ignore the changes that the emerging Internet was almost certain to bring
or the likely difficulties caused by disruptive change.
The 1996 Act substantially moved communications law and
regulation forward by codifying for the first time the notion that wireline
communications services should operate in a competitive market. This
action was taken, of course, against the backdrop of AT&T divestiture
implementation, which itself formally launched the idea that long-distance
services could and should be competitive if split off from the "natural
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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monopoly" sector of local services. 2 While there was some nascent "local"
competition that the FCC helped jump start with its Expanded
Interconnectionand related dockets, 3 it was the 1996 Act that took the first
statutory step to recognize affirmatively the goal of wireline services
competition across all markets.
The core of the statute's market opening provisions represented a type
of trade-off between the local competition interconnection and access
provisions and the opening of the long-distance services market to the
former Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"). In fact, Sections 251-52 and
271-72, concerning local competition and long distance, were designed as
a roadmap that in effect rewarded BOCs that complied with the statute's
directive to open their lines so that consumers could have access to
competitive carriers for their telephone services. 4 Given that the incumbent
carriers at that time controlled almost all last mile loops, Congress
recognized that the market opening would be more of a prying than a
happily negotiated arrangement. Under the law's framework, local service
competition was premised not only on unbundling piece parts of the
network ("UNEs"), but upon resale as well, with the express goal not to
dictate to would-be competitors how best to woo consumers with their
competitive services. 5 In today's parlance, the Act expressed no preference
for either intermodal or intramodal competition; to the contrary, it
affirmatively sought to promote both.
In addition to codifying a procompetitive direction, the 1996 Act also
took critical steps to tackle the difficult issues of universal service and
intercarrier compensation, including for wireless services. 6 Though these
issues are still far from resolved, it is notable that Congress understood
sufficiently the interconnectedness of pricing, service availability, and
leverage; these key provisions were designed to address the practical
realities of an emerging industry in formerly monopoly territory. Put more
directly, the law was informed by real-world accounts of incumbent carrier
practices that could surely kill competitors without some oversight. While
2. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 335-38 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter
Modification of FinalJudgment], aJFd sub nom., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
3. Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, Report and
Orderand Notice of ProposedRulemaking 7 F.C.C.R. 7369 (1992), modified by 8 F.C.C.R.
127 (1992), modified by 8 F.C.C.R. 7341 (1993), vacated in part and remanded, Bell
Atlantic Tel. Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
4. See Telecommunications Act §§ 251-52, 271-72.
5. See id. § 251; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996),
modified by 11 F.C.C.R. 13042, modified by 12 F.C.C.R. 12460, recon. by 14 F.C.C.R.
18049 [hereinafter Local Competition Order].
6. Telecommunications Act §§ 251, 254.
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it is hard to know how the legislature envisioned implementation, and it is
likely that no one foresaw the Jarndyce versus Jarndyce7 nature of the
subsequent legal wrangling that ensued, the 1996 Act remains a milestone
in communications legislation and is still the model for many nations who
have adopted analogues to many of the key competition-oriented
provisions.
1. CONGRESS LOOKED BACK AND THOUGHT AHEAD
Reflecting an understanding of the steps the FCC had taken to
facilitate competition in the information services sector, the 1996 Act also
codified the Commission's basic/enhanced distinction between
"telecommunications services" on the one hand and "information services"
on the other. 8 Notably, these definitions were integral both to the decades
of successful FCC rulemaking that helped propel the information services
industry from the data processing functions of the 1960s to the robust
Internet services market that grewup in the 1990s and to the Modification
of Final Judgment court that oversaw the breakup of the BOCs from
AT&T.9 In fact, in numerous places, the 1996 Act expressly supports and
endorses the growth of information services competition, clearly reflecting
congressional approval of the FCC's supple implementation of the 1934
Act. 0 Despite today's talk that these definitions are less relevant than
previously, the growth of the information services sector under this legal
paradigm speaks volumes.
The Congress that passed the 1996 Act was also forward-thinking.
While much is currently made of the enormous growth of the Internet and
broadband services since the passage of the 1996 Act, there is no doubt that
these services were squarely within the scope of issues before the 104th
Congress. Numerous sections all reflect an awareness of the technologies
and services that have proliferated in the ten years that have elapsed." To
be sure, Congress did not know that Amazon would become a major
presence or that Google would become a supremely popular search engine
among web seekers, but they were well aware of the Internet as well as its
potential to pose a competitive, disruptive change. In fact, the FCC at that
time was touting the benefits of Internet telephony as a way to address the
7. Readers will recall the never ending case immortalized in Charles Dickens' Bleak
House. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HouSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).
8. Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, FirstReport and Order and FurtherNotice of
ProposedRulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, para. 106 (1996).
9. Modification of FinalJudgment, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
10. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act,.§§ 254, 256, 257, 259, 271, 275, 601.
11.

Id.§§ 230,706.
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thorny problem of exorbitant international settlement rates. 12 As for
broadband, it was no secret that cable companies were actively upgrading
their facilities and the BOCs had long before developed DSL technology
but failed to deploy it for many years. 13 The push for broadband
deployment was wise and the goal of competitive broadband deployment
even wiser.
IV. WHAT WE CAN SEE IN HINDSIGHT: PITFALLS ON THE
COMPETITIVE ROAD
For all its plusses, there is little question that the 1996 Act was far
from a model law insofar as implementation. Though there is much finger
pointing and probably as many disparate views as to root causes as there
are industry participants and pundits, the fact is that the future did not
unfold in an orderly way producing the desired competition as rapidly or
smoothly as legislators and competitors had hoped. Ironically, one major
problem with implementation might simply have been the extraordinarily
short deadlines that the statute provided for implementation of complex and
sweeping changes. While the FCC and others strived to comply with those
deadlines, and there is indeed a benefit to swift action especially in an
industry better know for a glacial pace, there are some issues that are just
not susceptible to resolution in 180 days. 14 As agencies go, the FCC has a
very talented staff; yet, faced with multiple simultaneous deadlines on
difficult matters, it is no wonder that initial iterations of implementing rules
were far from perfect. It appears, with hindsight, that Congress may have
underestimated the magnitude of the task it delegated to the FCC in light of
the speed at which it expected action.
Similarly, while the law commendably recognized the important
policy interests surrounding universal service goals, the FCC's ongoing
access charge rulings, and the need for a sustainable intercarrier
compensation mechanism, it did not give clear direction as to how to

12. See e.g., International Settlement Rates, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19806,
paras. 9-13; Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
Market, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23891 (1997);
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, para. 93 (1998).
13. See e.g., Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, Second Report and Order,Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992).
14. For example, while Congress directed the FCC to adopt and implement unbundled
network access and interconnection rules within six months, §251(d). The issue remains
unresolved even to date. See, e.g., Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Order on
Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533 (2004), appeal pending, Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, Nos. 051095 et al. (filed Feb. 24, 2005).
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resolve sometimes competing objectives. For instance, in fleshing out the
scope of the Sections 251 and 252 intercarrier compensation provisions,
together with the admonition regarding access charges, the FCC came up
with an intricate framework that eventually incorporated EELs and other
acronyms nowhere mentioned (or seemingly contemplated) in the 1996
Act. In turn, these efforts to harmonize by the FCC caused it to come
under attack by a barrage of parties, each claiming the goals of the 1996
Act as the basis for action, with many of these parties eventually turning to
the courts as the final arbiter of the statute's meaning and the scope of the
Commission's authority.
Finally, while the statute gave nod to the FCC's successful regime for
information service providers, it failed to grasp that information services
were and remain the wave of the future, offering consumers diversity,
innovation, and choice in ways distinct from telecommunications services.
As such, Congress did not expressly state that consumers should continue
to gain unfettered access to all information service providers and their
offerings, even when those offerings compete with the affiliated
information services of last-mile owners. On the other hand, neither did the
statute direct that information service providers should have no access. Had
the Congress addressed directly how such services should be treated for
purposes of consumer access, interconnection, pricing, and other
regulation, it is likely that years of uncertainty could have been avoided,
allowing companies to devote resources to workable business models
within defined parameters rather than to legal and political strategies aimed

at attaining clarity.16

V. WHERE TO Now? PRINCIPLES TO KEEP IN MIND GOING
FORWARD
Though there are far more lessons from the 1996 Act, four guiding
principles emerge from the competitive wireline arena of the last ten years
to assist us as we contemplate changes to the Communications Act.

15. See, e.g., Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Order on Remand and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978 (2003), as modified
by Errata, 18 F.C.C.R. 19020, recon., 19 F.C.C.R. 15856, recon., 19 F.C.C.R. 20293,
vacated and remanded in part, affd in part, U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
16. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688 (2005), which culminated roughly ten years of uncertainty regarding cable obligations
to offer common carriage transmission services.

Number 3]

A.

HINDSIGHT: 1996 ACT 10 YEARS LATER

Technology Will Not Solve All Problems

First, while technological progress has enormous potential to enhance
the reliability and ubiquity of our national communications infrastructure, it
is erroneous to assume that technology alone will create an affordable,
diverse, and innovative system of communications that will also meet our
social policy objectives. For example, while the advent of wireless and
satellite technologies has enhanced the delivery of services to rural
Americans, issues of universal service nonetheless remain to be addressed.
Likewise, although we have made promising strides in many areas,
including significant steps to deploy services such as broadband-overpower lines and enhancements to satellite broadband technology to bring
service to more consumers, the fact is that technology has not offered a
competitive choice of broadband for many consumers.
Indeed, the ability of facilities owners to manipulate technology can
itself pose certain dangers to a functioning and robust communications
landscape. As advocates of "net neutrality" often reference, as "new"
networks are deployed using IP technology and equipment, there is the
potential that the networks will be constructed and managed so as to favor
affiliated content and services, thereby diminishing consumer choice and
decreasing service options. While the answer is not for Congress or the
FCC to engage in micromanaging technological advances, certainly the
potential for such adverse impacts should be acknowledged and
policymakers should be prepared to act decisively and swiftly to ensure that
facilities owners do not use technology to stifle competition. In sum, for all
its promise, technology will not change market conditions, whether
disparities in negotiating leverage between entrenched incumbents and
competitive newcomers, economic disparities among communities, or the
business incentives of companies seeking to capture consumers'
communications dollars.
B.

Duopoly Does Not Amount to Competition

Second, we have yet to attain full-fledged wireline services
competition. Undoubtedly, during the last decade, cable companies have
made enormous advances in upgrading and utilizing their traditional cable
infrastructure for broader communications services. Today, many
consumers obtain telephone, data, and IP-based services from their cable
companies, and the cable industry boasts that cable's advanced digital
services, such as high-speed Internet access, digital cable, video-ondemand, and telephone service, are available to more than 105 million
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homes, or eighty-eight percent of U.S. households passed by cable. 17 This
is certainly good news for consumers that previously could purchase some
of those services only from their incumbent telephone company since now
there is at least an option in some areas of the country. Yet, there should be
no confusion that even in those areas, there is not full-fledged competition.
Economists and others have long known that a duopoly, while arguably
more competitive than a monopoly, is less than optimal. Simply put, to
obtain the benefits that competition brings-greater innovation, declining
prices, and improved service quality-robust competition is needed.
Going forward, we are well served to bear in mind the lessons of the
past. For instance, while wireless services are today generally competitive,
such was not always the case. In the early days of wireless (the 1980s),
wireless was a government-endorsed duopoly, with the incumbent wireline
telephone companies securing one of the two licenses in a given area. As
the wireless industry slowly began to grow, it became apparent that to
obtain the benefits of vigorous competition, additional competitors were
required. Congress responded by allowing the FCC to auction spectrum for
PCS services. Today, consumers have multiple wireless options; most
importantly, subscribership has exploded and per-minute prices have
dropped dramatically. Notably, as new competitors emerged, government
did not sit idly by hoping incumbents would treat new players fairly.
Instead, in key areas such as spectrum allocation and licensing, auction setasides for small businesses, interconnection, and intercarrier compensation,
there was an express recognition that competition requires2governmental
input to ensure unequal negotiating leverage does not sink it.
17. NCTA, Broadband Information, http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?
pagelD=37> (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
18. See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, The
Principleof Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment
and Innovation, 2000 U CI LEGAL F 119, 139-40 (2000) ("There is a long tradition of
skepticism among economists and antitrust enforcers as to whether two firms are sufficient
to create effective competition. When there are only two competitors, the two often achieve
some sort of implicit accommodation with one another not to compete vigorously."). See
also FTC v. H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d 708, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("In a duopoly, a market with
only two competitors, supracompetitive pricing at monopolistic levels is a danger.")
(citation omitted); Application of Echostar Communications Corporation, (a Nevada
Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Delaware
Corporations), Hearing DesignationOrder, 17 F.C.C.R. 20559, para. 100 (2002) ("[C]ourts
have generally condemned mergers that result in duopoly ....
");id. para. 103 ("[E]xisting
antitrust doctrine suggests that a merger to duopoly or monopoly faces a strong presumption
of illegality.").
19. 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (2000).
20. See CTIA SEMI-ANNuAL WIRELESS SURVEY (2005), http://files.ctia.orglpdf/CTIA
MidYear2005Survey.pdf.
21. See, e.g, Local Competition Order, supra note 5, para. 34 (ordering LECs "to enter
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Accordingly, there should be no mistake about the true state of
competition in the wireline telecommunications area. Competitive carriers,
having gone through many twists and turns on the competitive road, are not
as far ahead as many had hoped. Especially in the growing broadband
space, most consumers face only two competitors-the local incumbent
telephone carrier and the cable company-and even this choice is not
available to many Americans. Although we may be able to sense that real
competition lies ahead, no amount of viewing today's data from different
angles will turn the current broadband landscape into anything, at best,
beyond duopoly. Until genuine competition emerges, lawmakers and
regulators should keep an especially watchful eye on potential
anticompetitive conduct in the emerging broadband services marketplace.
As with the 1996 Act itself, deregulation should follow fulsome
competition, not precede it.
C.

Consumer Choice Should Govern Service Deployment

Third, consumer choice must be honored, which not only places the
emphasis where it belongs but best serves core First Amendment principles
and the free flow of ideas. Perhaps the greatest benefit of a plethora of
competitive service offerings is the ability of consumers to take the services
that best meet their needs-and only those services. No consumer should
be required to take a service simply because the provider can leverage its
control over less competitive offerings. Fortunately, there is growing
awareness of this fundamental tenet and for this reason, for much of the
country, consumers are no longer required to purchase legacy local
22
telephone service as a condition of obtaining broadband DSL services.
This approach provides a solid foundation for consumer preferences to
dictate market development and best serves vibrant competition. While
consumers should be able to avail themselves of service bundles-and may
indeed reap service and efficiency benefits-they should not be forced to
take what they do not want.
Similarly, to ensure that consumers are truly able to select the services
that best meet their needs, core net neutrality principles should be adopted,
with adequate enforcement and oversight. While it may be the case that
into reciprocal compensation arrangements with CMRS providers, including paging
providers, for the transport and termination of traffic on each other's networks" pursuant to
section 251(b)(5).").
22. See Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, para. 3 (2005);
SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of
Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18290, para. 3 (2005)
(incorporating stand-alone DSL commitments).
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there are no serious problems today, and that many, if not most, service
providers voluntarily adhere to net neutrality directives because it is good
business, the fact is that once practices become entrenched, it is virtually
impossible for government to step in and change them. In fact,
communications history is rife with examples of industry pleading that
regulation is premature and later claiming reliance on no regulation when
regulators seek to step in and address abuses. As we journey into a world
of ever-growing IPand broadband service options, we should ensure that if
consumers choose video or IP applications through one provider (e.g.,
Google or EarthLink) the network facilities owner should not be able to
undermine those choices.
D. Effective Enforcement is Vital to Successful Regulatory
Implementation
Finally, the need for and benefit of effective and swift enforcement of
legal rights and obligations is vital. Of all the lessons the 1996 Act has
taught us, this is perhaps the most important. As many a new competitor
quickly learned, it is the small companies who are most often in need of
enforcement that are outgunned in terms of resources. Incumbents and
large entities well know that the legal process can be used as a tool to kill
competition, often by a slow, procedural death. The old saw that "justice
delayed is justice denied" has nowhere proved to be more true than in the
communications wars, with issues dragging on in multiple fora and endless
legal maneuvering. Aggrieved parties often focus on public relations and
lobbying strategies rather than pursue legitimate legal rights given the time
and resources that would be required to attain a possible victory years later.
What is needed is a clear statutory framework to address violations of
the law; in effect, a revamped Section 208 process that recognizes the fastmoving pace of the current communications environment. Keys to such a
framework are reasonable and swift statutory deadlines; a right to
immediate access in questions of access and interconnection, pending the
outcome of the dispute; and the right to attorney's fees and punitive
damages. The FCC should also be given express direction to consider
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as "last offer" or "baseball23. For example, the cable industry urged in 1974 that a common carrier-type
separation between content and conduit should not be implemented because such a policy
would be best applied to a more developed and mature industry. See CABINET COMMITTEE

4 (1974). When the FCC looked
again at this issue, the cable industry urged that it has built its network with private capital
in reliance upon established policies. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002).
ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
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style" arbitration. Not only will these measures be a giant step to ensuring
that parties can obtain effective redress, but they should encourage parties
to reach mutually agreeable settlement of their disputes in light of the threat
of meaningful sanctions. While not all possible disputes can or should be
the subject of prophylactic regulation, there must be effective means to
address the inevitable bumps on the competitive road.
VI. CONCLUSION
We who spend our careers enmeshed in communications law know
that uncertainty is certain. We often find ourselves guessing about how to
forecast and adapt to future legal and technology changes, especially as
new laws are being discussed. Consistent experience teaches, however, that
while hindsight often reveals missed signals and off-base predictions, we
must be guided by the past and be prepared to use it to refine our laws
going forward. While adoption of these four guiding principles may not
prevent missteps, it is hoped that they will serve us well in 2006 and
beyond.
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